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*I.P.Q. 307 Abstract
According to the principle of copyright exhaustion, once a copy of a work is placed on the market, the
right holder’s control over further distribution of that copy is exhausted. Unlike the distribution of hard
copies of copyright works, however, the electronic dissemination of content is not subject to the
exhaustion principle. This means that second-hand markets of digital goods cannot exist.
Traditionally, exhaustion is premised on four assumptions that cannot be safely assumed in the online
context: it applies to tangible copies only; it covers goods and not services; the goods should be sold
but not licensed; and the property entitlement should be alienated upon transfer. After long
jurisprudential silence, courts at worldwide level have revisited these normative impediments to affirm
that exhaustion can apply online in specific instances. The article discusses the doctrinal norms that
underpin exhaustion and determines the conditions under which online copyright exhaustion can
apply.
Introduction
On January 29, 2013, Amazon Inc was awarded a US patent for a "secondary market for digital
objects", including e-books, audio, video, computer applications purchased from an original vendor.1
The invention consists of a system of personalised data stores and envisages the creation of a
second-hand market of digital goods. As acknowledged in the description of this invention, while
physical objects—such as hard copies of works—only exist in one place at a time, digital goods can
be reproduced easily and inexpensively with no loss of fidelity. Because repeated copying represents
a threat in maintaining the scarcity of digital goods, their transfer may pose copyright problems, in
particular with respect to the first sale doctrine2 or licence obligations. What Amazon’s patented
system does is to challenge possible copyright restrictions on the online resale of digital copies by
creating conditions resembling the transfer of hard copies. This is achieved through personalised data
stores that enable:
"storage of the digital object at the receiving storage location or computing device and deletion of the
digital object from the sending storage location or computing device".3
Promising to create the conditions for a second-hand market for digital goods, the invention is
specifically designed with a view to overcome the legal norms arising from the first sale doctrine, what
in the European *I.P.Q. 308 vernacular is referred to as copyright exhaustion.4 Exhaustion is a legal
principle according to which, once a copy of a copyright work is distributed to the public by a sale or
otherwise, the right holder’s exclusive right to control further distribution of that copy is exhausted,
and the purchaser is free to use or resell it without further copyright restraints. As opposed to the
distribution of hard copies of works, however, the electronic dissemination of copyright content is not
"exhausted" after the work has been first put on the market with the consent of the right holders. In
practice, this means that the right holders remain in control of every subsequent communication of
works to the public. This is a clearly established position of European copyright law. However, legal
uncertainty remains regarding the precise limits of the exhaustion doctrine in online communications.
For instance, it is not clear whether users can resell digital files they have lawfully acquired or simply
retransmit content that is freely available online under authorial consent through hyperlinks or by
embedding the copyright content in another website, such as their Facebook page. A recent ruling of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found that it is permissible to resell software
licences even if the digital good has been downloaded directly from the internet. While the court
affirmed that exhaustion can apply to digital distribution, it moved on to state that this is a lex specialis
covering computer programs only but does not apply to other categories of copyright content.5 Recent
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cases from national courts have upheld the limited application of the CJEU ruling to software only.6
The exhaustion principle has traditionally been justified through the lens of property law in the sense
that it marked the dividing line between two distinct, yet colliding, forms of property: the intellectual
property rights on the "intellectual creation" (work, invention, brand) and the right of ownership over
the embodiment thereof, i.e. the tangible medium (copy, product). In copyright law, the observation
that the work is distinct from its physical embodiment made its way very early into case law, and
features in rulings of the mid-18th century, such as the UK case Millar v Taylor.7 A normative
explanation of exhaustion was originally developed in German scholarship, such as the work of
Kohler,8 and it also finds roots in the common law doctrine on the alienation of property.9 Albeit
conceptually implicit, the central hypothesis behind the property justification for the exhaustion
principle is the "tangibility" of the medium in which the intellectual creation has been incorporated. The
hard copy is a "chattel" that can be distributed in hand-to-hand transactions and can hence qualify as
an object of property. It is not easy to assume this property rationale when it comes to electronic
copies of works, however. This is not only because they lack tangibility, but also because they are
usually licensed under terms and conditions that exclude any transfer of property.10
However, if exhaustion used to apply to hard copies because of their very nature as tangible
embodiments of the work—and hence their capacity of being objects of property—the question
inevitably arises as to whether an artificial recreation of the central constituents of tangibility in the
online world could give rise *I.P.Q. 309 to exhaustion. What are these constitutive elements of
tangibility that are capable of generating exhaustion? How, and on what conditions, can these
elements be replicated in an intangible context?
The article responds to these questions by attacking the four normative impediments to the
application of the exhaustion principle in the online context, all of which relate to tangibility. First,
exhaustion applies to tangible goods, i.e. the copies of copyright works, and not to the work as such.
What is exhausted is the right holders’ entitlement over the further distribution of the "copies" after
they have been placed on the market under authorial consent,11 but any further communication of the
"work" as such is still subject to the right holder’s authorisation.12 The second interrelated premise is
that exhaustion applies to goods and not to services. This is the clearest manifestation of the property
rationale of this doctrine. While it is easy to see how the physical copy of a work qualifies as good,
electronic copies are commonly accessed as part of services, like TV licences or online digital media
stores. In these cases, end-users cannot have claims of property entitlement over the content. It is for
this reason that the nature of the transaction, which may be either a sale or a licence, becomes a
pivotal factor in determining the scope of exhaustion and functions as its third premise. Finally,
exhaustion applies only to the exact same copy that has been lawfully placed on the market. Each
new copy is subject to a new distribution right. This latter condition excludes "second generation
copies", even those that are lawfully made, from the benefit of exhaustion. For instance, copies made
by users under the exception for private copying13 cannot be placed on the market without the right
holder’s consent.
All four premises for the applicability of exhaustion with regard to the analogue distribution of copies
do not apply squarely in the online environment, mainly because the nature of electronic copies and
the modalities of their dissemination are substantially different. This article investigates the normative
roots of these obstacles with a view to determine whether, and under what conditions, exhaustion can
also cover the electronic dissemination of copyright works.
Does exhaustion apply online? The emphasis on tangibility
The central proposition behind the application of the exhaustion principle is that it applies to the
embodiment rather than to the work as such. This proposition has been frequently—although
implicitly—understood as requiring that the work is embodied in some kind of tangible medium. This
was clearly stated in the US case Capitol Records v ReDigi,14 for instance, where a distinction was
made between the copyright work and the tangible medium of fixation. Citing the House Report on the
Copyright Act, the District Court for the Southern District of New York stressed that "‘sound
recordings’ as copyrightable subject matter are distinguished from ‘phonorecords[,]’ the latter being
physical objects in which sounds are fixed".15 The issue was also discussed in light of rulings on file
sharing, such as London-Sire Records v John Doe,16 where the question turned as to whether
peer-to-peer software violated copyright owners’ distribution rights. In that case, the District Court for
the District of Massachusetts made an express distinction between the copyright work—or digital
music file—and the phonorecord—or "appropriate segment of the hard disk" in which the file would be
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embodied following its transfer.17 On the basis of these findings, the court in ReDigi found that: *I.P.Q.
310
"when a user downloads a digital music file or ‘digital sequence’ to his ‘hard disk,’ the file is
‘reproduce[d]’ on a new phonorecord within the meaning of the Copyright Act",
an understanding that is confirmed by the laws of physics.18
In Europe too, there are a number of Directives that rely on the presence of a physical medium to
determine whether the copies of works are goods or not, and whether the exhaustion principle should
apply. It will be shown that this emphasis on tangibility is mainly instrumental. Tangible copies of
works can classify as goods on which full property transfers can subsist. The nature of the copy
essentially impacts on the nature of the transaction. The application of exhaustion to "physical" copies
of works only, like those that can be exchanged in hand-to-hand transactions, first appeared in the
Computer Programs Directive.19 In its report on the implementation of this Directive, the Commission
clarified that exhaustion "only applies to the sale of copies i.e. goods, whereas supply through on-line
services does not entail exhaustion".20
It is expressly stated in art.3(3) of the Directive that the exhaustion principle does not cover the
communication or otherwise making available works to the public21; exhaustion can only apply to the
distribution of tangible copies subject to the conditions set in art.4(2).22 This restrictive position echoes
the preparatory work made before the adoption of this Directive, where it was systematically repeated
that exhaustion applies to tangible copies only. Reliance on tangibility was mainly meant to exemplify
the method in which the content is delivered to the public, i.e. to draw a distinction between
hand-to-hand transactions and services. It first featured in the Follow-up to the Copyright Green
Paper, according to which: "a large consensus exists that no exhaustion of rights occurs in respect of
works and other subject matter exploited on-line, as this qualifies as a service".23 This restriction,
which results from the distinction between hard copies and content disseminated via online services,
became more concrete in the Proposal to the Information Society Directive,24 which allowed
exhaustion to the distribution of the "object",25 elsewhere referred to as "tangible article", "material
copy" or "material medium, namely an item of goods".26 Although this statutory language could reflect
early, and perhaps out-dated, models of online distribution, Recital 29 of the Information Society
Directive expressly draws a line between material copies, the dissemination of which is subject to the
exhaustion principle, and the delivery of content through services, where dissemination is not
exhausted and where any subsequent redistribution of those works is subject to the exclusive control
of right holders.27 It reads: *I.P.Q. 311
"The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line services in particular.
This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work or other subject-matter made by a user of
such a service with the consent of the rightholder. Therefore, the same applies to rental and lending
of the original and copies of works or other subject-matter which are services by nature. Unlike
CD-ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material medium, namely an
item of goods, every on-line service is in fact an act which should be subject to authorisation where
the copyright or related right so provides."
The use of tangibility as the distinguishing factor of the nature of the transaction was based on an
expansive interpretation of art.6(1) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and art.8 of the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty that allegedly apply to tangible copies only.28 The substantive
minima imposed by these provisions state that signatories should confer a distribution right that will
include "the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or
other transfer of ownership". The signatory countries are left with the discretion to apply the principle
of exhaustion "after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the original or a copy of the work
with the authorization of the author".29 It is specified in the agreed statements that copies that are
subject to the distribution right be "fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects".30
While explicitly leaving signatory states the freedom to determine whether and how to enact
exhaustion regarding the physical distribution of works, the WIPO Treaties remain silent as to the
application of the exhaustion rule in online transactions; it is only implicitly assumed that the question
of exhaustion does not arise with regard to the online sale and delivery of content.
Demystifying tangibility
The Information Society Directive has moved a step forward from the minima imposed by the WIPO
Internet Treaties by assimilating the copies distributed online to services, without, however, offering a
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justification as to why this ought to be the case. Because the online sale and delivery of content are
considered to fall under online services, exhaustion does not apply.31 This has important legal
ramifications: consumers of electronic content that has been made available through an online
licensing scheme cannot resell these copies without infringing copyright. This applies for instance to
TV licences, electronic content available for download, or subscriptions to online streaming services.
It also covers content that has been bought independently and not as part of a subscription in cases
where access to the content is not autonomous—e.g. by having a lawfully downloaded copy on the
computer memory or portable media for an indefinite period of time—but depends on authorisation
from an online service. This is because consumers cannot exercise autonomous control over this
content in a way that would amount to property rights over it. This inconsistent treatment of hard
copies and online content becomes source of legal uncertainty, as consumers gain a lesser
entitlement over electronically disseminated content than on tangible copies of works, either analogue
or digital.
This emphasis on tangibility has also been recently repeated in the Consumer Directive,
which—subject to limited exceptions—defines goods as any "tangible" movable item,32 even though
no definition of services is offered.33 With regard to copies of copyright works (digital content), Recital
19 of this Directive *I.P.Q. 312 specifies that copies supported by a physical medium that is capable
of being exchanged from hand to hand, such as a CD or a DVD, fall under the definition of "goods".34
On the contrary, copies distributed online with no physical supporting medium can qualify neither as
goods nor as services35: they are of a sui generis nature. This marks a departure from the position of
the Information Society Directive, which deals with these copies as part of an online service. It is not
yet clear however what the impact of the Consumer Directive will be as to the application of the
exhaustion principle, and there is room to assume that these copies may be subject to exhaustion if
they do not clearly fall under the definition of services.
Services, however, are not often defined in statutes and the few available definitions do not serve well
in identifying their scope and nature.36 Statutes attach emphasis on tangibility to draw the distinction
between goods and services, and on this ground they may not be particularly enlightening in
considerations over the legal nature of electronic content. In various jurisdictions, for instance, the
definition of goods is linked to tangible "personal property" or "movable property",37 and the concept of
"choses in action", which could include electronic content, is often excluded from its scope.38 This is
also reflected in case law, where the determination of whether copies qualify as goods depends on
the existence of a physical medium. In St Alban’s for instance, the judge stated that—in the
determination of whether a computer program is a good or not—the decisive factor is the presence of
a physical medium to supply the copy of the computer software.39 This can be inferred by references
to the program as "the intangible instructions or commands" and to "the (intangible) program itself".40
There are a number of cases that have followed a similar approach from the perspective of various
legal disciplines, such as sales of goods, tax law or consumer protection.41
Separating works from their tangible embodiment
Considerations of tangibility in the context of copyright exhaustion have been taken into account by
the Court of Justice in a number of cases with a view to determine whether the work can be separable
from its tangible embodiment. The focus in these cases was placed on the nature of the legal
transaction and *I.P.Q. 313 the way in which tangibility impacts on the modalities of dissemination. In
Coditel v Cine-Vog,42 the European Court of Justice found that even though films belong to the
category of literary and artistic works, the way in which they are disseminated to the public is different
in nature. Films are made available to the public through performances, which can be infinitely
repeated. This is not the case with other categories of works, such as books and records where
distribution is "inseparable from the circulation of the material form of the works".43 This has a
practical implication in the sense that distribution through performance results in a legitimate interest
of the right holders in being entitled to charge fees for the authorised performance of films on basis of
the actual or probable number of performances.44 It can hence be said that the dissemination of films
is more likely to fall under a broader definition of services, which remains under authorial control. This
position was reiterated in the second instance where Coditel v Cine-Vog was heard by the Court of
Justice.45 The commercial exploitation of films was found to come under the movement of services as
the performance of films can indefinitely be repeated and hence the right holder’s entitlement to
require fees "is part of the essential function of copyright".46
The same rationale was upheld in cases dealing with the exercise of public performance or rental
rights.47 The application of exhaustion ultimately depends on whether the issue of the work to the
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public is separate from its tangible embodiment or not. Where the nature of the public dissemination
is such that the work and the copy are inseparable, as is the case with public performance,
exhaustion cannot apply. In Tournier, for instance,48 it was held that exhaustion does not apply:
"where the act of making a work available to the public is inseparable from the circulation of the
physical medium on which it is recorded".49
Albeit not expressly stated, the reason for this exclusion rests on the very nature of public
dissemination and the way in which property rights on the copy and the intellectual property rights on
the work can be "split" for legal purposes. If this distinction cannot be clearly ascertained through the
presence of a hard copy, exhaustion cannot apply. This is also the case in instances where there is a
tangible copy but the mode of its public dissemination does not involve a permanent transfer of
property rights on the copy, as with rental and lending.50
Rights subsisting in works and rights subsisting in copies
It follows that not all authorial rights under copyright subsist in the same object of protection,
technically speaking: some rights subsist in the work and others in the commercial copies thereof.
The reproduction or the adaptation right, as well as the rights of public performance, are paradigmatic
examples of the first category. What can be copied, modified or performed is the work per se, namely
the author’s intellectual creation. Rights of dissemination, however, including the distribution right, the
electronic communication right and the rental and lending rights, are all instances where the object of
protection is the copy rather *I.P.Q. 314 than the work per se.51 Even if public communication
normally implies reproduction—since the making of intermediate copies is technically necessary in
most acts of electronic communication—the object of protection remains distinct.52 To borrow the
terminology used in property law, in this latter category of rights, both "choses in action" (the
intellectual property right in the work) and "choses in possession" (the property right in the copy) may
subsist in the same copy of a copyright work at the same time, with the ownership belonging to
different parties (i.e. the author of the work and the owner of the copy). With distribution, this
dichotomy can safely be assumed, as—with the first sale or other issue of copies to the public—the
two property entitlements are split, with this schism giving rise to exhaustion of the rights on the copy
through property alienation.
This is not the case with rental and lending, and also with the electronic communication of works.
With regard to rental and lending rights, there are three layers of property entitlements: the intellectual
property rights on the work, the property right on the copy that is lent, and rights to possess the rented
copy for a specified amount of time. Even though exhaustion covers the first sale of the copy to a
library or a DVD rental store, for instance, it does not apply to the act of rental or lending of the copy.53
This restriction can be justified on the ground that rights over the copies as "choses in possession" do
not subsist for an indefinite amount of time. Such rights could be those created by a full transfer of
property right on the copies, for instance, through sale.54 Rights of ownership for an indefinite amount
of time on behalf of content consumers cannot also be clearly ascertained with regard to the
electronic communication of works. This is because content disseminated online possesses
characteristics of both "choses in action" and "choses in possession". It is unclear how in electronic
content, such as e-books and MP3 files, the various layers of ownership may be split between right
holders and consumers, most notably because of the vague legal nature of the digital copy, which is
difficult to fall under the definition of goods.
When works and copies coincide
This is why the classification of copies of copyright works as goods becomes prominent. Such a
classification does not only depend on the way in which public dissemination takes place but also on
the category of the work as such. For certain categories of works the tangibility/intangibility distinction
may be redundant as the copy and the work coincide. This is, for instance, the case with artistic
works, especially the ones of unique materialisation. A sculpture or a painting is both an original
creation and an object.55 Even though the requirement of fixation for artistic works may not be
statutorily provided, tangibility is an implicit prerequisite for copyright subsistence, usually referred to
as lack of ephemeral character.56 This is not the case with other categories of works, however, where
the work as subject-matter of copyright protection and the copy as the product embodying a work are
separable, although often not in a straightforward sense, mainly because of the various ways in which
works can be publicly disseminated. *I.P.Q. 315 In these cases, which could in principle include all
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other categories of protected subject-matter, the classification of a work as a good cannot safely be
ascertained. The determinant factor is the mode of public dissemination and the way in which
property rights in the work and its tangible embodiment may be distinguished, a determination that
relies heavily on tangibility considerations.57
Why do computer programs differ?
With certain categories of works, however, this test may work better. For instance, unlike films, sound
recordings and literary works, computer programs may be seen as separable from the disk, because
the substance of the transaction is the information, which may be transferred by means other than the
disk.58 The same applies to some other "functional" works, such as ringtones or mobile applications of
dictionaries and encyclopaedias. Contrary to other copyright-protected works, in these cases the copy
of the work is merely a support of the final product and the distinction between the work and its copy
cannot be safely ascertained. This was flagged in the UK case Beta Computers v Adobe Systems,59
where the coincidence of a physical supporting medium, such as a disk, with the copy of a copyright
work, e.g. software, was found artificial in determining the nature of the work as a good.
For software, however, online exhaustion does apply. In UsedSoft v Oracle,60 the court was asked to
determine whether the distribution right applied only to "tangible property" or whether it also applied to
"intangible copies", such as copies of computer programs.61 The court found that intangible copies of
software are also covered by the exhaustion principle. To reach this conclusion, it delved into an
interpretation of art.4(2) of the Computer Programs Directive in conjunction with art.1(2) and Recital 7
of the Preamble. Article 4(2) refers to the "sale … of a copy of a program" and the protection afforded
by the Directive is expanded through art.1(2) to the expression "in any form of a computer program",
as also indicated in the seventh Recital.62 The court stressed that the Computer Programs Directive is
a lex specialis in relation to the broader framework of copyright protection laid down by the
Information Society Directive.63 It did not, however, offer an explanation as to how computer programs
differ from other copyright works and whether the same position would have been reached should the
case be examined under the spectrum of the Information Society Directive.64 Albeit limited in its
capacity, this decision develops an important normative interpretation of the distribution right by
waiving its artificial premise on the tangibility requirement.65
Beyond tangibility
The question remains, however, as to whether exhaustion should also cover the online dissemination
of copyright works. With tangibility considerations being only peripheral to the determination of the
nature of goods and the legal transaction, further to the rulings of the Court of Justice, other factors
may be put into the equation and lead to safer conclusions. As early as in 1985, Bonna Lynn Horovitz
had suggested *I.P.Q. 316 that in discussions on the tangibility v intangibility divide, prominence
should be given to the element of "movability".66 According to Horovitz:
"A program is intangible in the sense that it cannot be touched or felt, but not in the sense that it
cannot be moved and identified to a contract." 67
Adopting a purposive approach, Horovitz concluded that the decisive factor for classifying a thing as a
good is not tangibility in a narrow construal of the term but it is "movability, transferability, and
identification at the time of sale",68 understood as the underlying condition for the transfer of
ownership. This element of movability as a determinant of the nature of a good is also repeated by
BEUC, the European Consumers’ organisation. In their position paper on the regulation of digital
products in the European Union, they argue in favour of the nature as a good of digital content in
cases where consumers can access digital products on a permanent basis and to store them.69 A
tangibility-free definition of digital content is also offered by international classifications, such as the
Nice Agreement on trade marks, according to which software qualifies as a good, irrespective of its
embodiment in a physical medium.70 The adoption of such a broader definition of "tangibility" could
remedy the artificial barrier created by the requirement of a physical supporting medium, especially
where this is a statutory prerequisite for the definition of "goods", as is the case for instance in
Directive 1999 on consumer guarantees.
Whereas in Europe the general rule is that exhaustion does not cover the public communication of a
work through an electronic network, there are various ways in which consumers may gain lawful
access to content online. Sometimes they may acquire a general licence to access a website, such as
through a streaming service, and in other cases they may purchase a licence to an identifiable work in
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electronic form for an indefinite amount of time. Statutes do not make a distinction between these two
ways of lawful access to content in terms of whether the content falls under the definition of goods or
services. Yet, there is enough room to interpret the Consumer Directive as allowing for such a
distinction, in the sense that when consumers buy access to specific content they buy goods covered
by a sales and not a services contract. Works that are disseminated under a licensing agreement are
more likely to fall under the definition of services, upon which no property entitlement on behalf of the
consumer can arise. It is hence important to clarify the legal nature of the digital copy, which may
qualify as a good, service, or even be of a sui generis nature. This classification impacts largely on
the way in which ownership rights may subsist on a digital good and on the way in which the property
alienation basis of analogue exhaustion cannot work in the online world.
Determining ownership over digital content
The absence of a physical carrier, such as a book, a CD or a DVD, in online transactions has
generated controversy as to whether the dissemination of content is a sale or a licence. Being less
popular in the analogue world where the physical hand-to-hand exchange of tangible embodiments of
works has long *I.P.Q. 317 been defined as sales of goods,71 this commercial practice has been in
use since the early days of the internet. Non-negotiated standard terms and conditions in the
dissemination of other kinds of copyright works have gained popularity in recent times, however, and
the Information Society Directive strongly supports the application of licensing terms in content
dissemination.72 As the online dissemination of content often requires a service such as internet
access or cloud storage to access works, it is not clear how to legally characterise such a transaction
as a whole.73
The legal classification of this kind of online distribution remains uncertain for various reasons. Most
of the ongoing debate is in the area of software licences, as it is not clear whether these agreements
qualify as sale, rental or sui generis contracts. In France, for instance, this remains an open question,
74 whereas in the United Kingdom, Lord Penrose found licence agreements to be of a sui generis
nature in Beta Computers v Adobe Systems.75 Most of the controversy as to the characterisation of
the legal transaction has to do with the very nature of exclusive rights. It is assumed—in the absence
of a physical supporting medium—that the licensing agreement does not also include a transfer of
ownership, i.e. a sale, of the copy.
When does a transaction qualify as a sale?
Reverting to property law to determine the limits of ownership via sale or licence, could, however,
offer some answers.76 In property law, the concept of sale includes the transfer of title, and hence the
object of a sale should be capable of "transfer of ownership".77 Fiona Smith and Lorna Woods have
combined the requirement of "tradability", as featuring in property law, with the one of "tangibility" to
offer a viable classification between goods and services.78 This aligns with the "movability" element,
discussed earlier. Smith and Woods explain that
"Tradability and tangibility serve as a series of filters, containing both objective and subjective
criteria... Tangibility then constitutes a rebuttable presumption that intangible items are services while
tangible items constitute goods. The product's function, in combination with tradability, then acts as
the determining factor." 79
This point is reflected in the reasoning developed in UsedSoft in the sense that tangibility is a filter in
classifying the legal nature of the object of the transaction but it is the kind of the transaction per se
that becomes the central distinguishing factor. In UsedSoft, the Court of Justice gave a broad
interpretation to the requirement of a sale in art.4(2) of the Computer Programs Directive. Embracing
the Opinion of A.G. Bot, the court held that if sale was not interpreted: *I.P.Q. 318
"[A]s encompassing all forms of product marketing characterised by the grant of a right to use a copy
of a computer program, for an unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to enable the
copyright holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the copy of the
work of which he is the proprietor, the effectiveness of that provision would be undermined, since
suppliers would merely have to call the contract a ‘licence’ rather than a ‘sale’ in order to circumvent
the rule of exhaustion and divest it of all scope." 80
The court hence found that downloading a copy of a computer program amounted to a transfer of its
ownership.81 According to the decision, the download of the copy of the computer program in
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combination with the conclusion of a user licence were a whole for purposes of legal classification.82
There were two main elements in the commercial transaction that weighted in this decision: there was
a one-time fee payment and the user gained access to the copy for an indefinite amount of time.83
Emphasising the distinction between the distribution right and the right of public communication, the
court rejected Oracle’s argument that it had "made available to the public" the copy of the computer
program on its website within the meaning of art.3(1) of the Information Society Directive, which does
not give rise to exhaustion.84 Highlighting that the Computer Programs Directive is lex specialis in
relation to the Information Society Directive, the court found that an online transmission is "the
functional equivalent of the supply of a material medium".85
Whereas on the basis of this dictum online exhaustion cannot apply to other copyright content outside
computer programs, the reasoning developed in UsedSoft regarding the nature of the commercial
transaction as the distinguishing factor between sales and licences is helpful in drawing the line with
regards to all kinds of digital goods. According to UsedSoft, it is the nature of the transaction that can
lead to a viable classification as to whether the electronic content qualifies as goods or services.
Once there is a one-off payment and the transaction grants possession to the copy for an indefinite
duration, it is more likely for the transaction to qualify as a sale.86 The way in which content is
transferred may give rise to various levels of consumer entitlement over the content, not all of which
clearly fall under the broader category of services. Where the transaction involves transfer of
possession, it is no longer covered by the broader notion of services. This is also the approach
followed by US courts that also take into account these criteria to classify a transaction as a sale,
although there is no judicial trend to be assumed.87
In Canada too, the Supreme Court recently reached a similar conclusion in Entertainment Software
Association.88 The court was called to determine whether transmission of musical works contained in
a video game through an internet download is a communication to the public, and can therefore be
the object of a separate tariff submitted by the respondent society to the Canadian Copyright Board
for approval. The court found that it is not. According to Abella and Moldaver JJ, downloading copies
of copyright works from the internet is just another way of getting access to content.89 Not all ways in
which content is disseminated online amount to a communication to the public however, despite the
fact that an electronic transmission is involved. The court made a distinction between downloading
and streaming in terms of the way in which the content is made available. This is the insight that is
offered: *I.P.Q. 319
"Although a download and a stream are both ‘transmissions’ in technical terms (they both use ‘data
packet technology’), they are not both ‘communications’ for purposes of the Copyright Act. This is
clear from the Board’s definition of a stream as ‘a transmission of data that allows the user to listen or
view the content at the time of transmission and that is not meant to be reproduced’… Unlike a
download, the experience of a stream is much more akin to a broadcast or performance." 90
As we have already seen, the rule of exhaustion does not apply when no sale or other transfer of
ownership takes place. Performances, lending or rental are more likely to qualify as services and
hence will not be subject to exhaustion.91
Power of control over the accessed content
Applying these principles to copyright protected electronic content suggests that not all online content
provision undisputedly qualifies as a service. The essential distinguishing factor hence becomes the
nature of the transaction, irrespective of tangibility considerations. Whereas through streaming
consumers are not in a position to exercise control over the content besides accessing it, this is not
the case with content that has been lawfully downloaded from an online service for an indefinite
amount of time. Critical in the understanding of a possible distinction between goods and services in
content offered online is the way in which the transfer takes place, despite the fact that Recital 29 of
the Information Society Directive seems to suggest otherwise. Unless the right holders are still in a
position to exercise control over the downloaded file, for instance by offering it for user possession for
a certain period of time, the content is goods and the users have a property entitlement over it.
Several online TV channels, which offer the content—mainly news reports—for downloading, can set
time-limits on its access, by deleting the content automatically from the user’s computer after a given
period of time.92 Whereas this content can be subject to the possession of the lawful user, no transfer
of ownership has taken place, as the right holders are still in position to exercise control over it.
It would only be in cases where consumers have the ability to exercise autonomous control and
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power over the protected works that a sale is likely to be assumed. The criterion is hence the very
nature of the transaction, which no longer qualifies as a service once transfer of possession for an
indefinite amount of time has taken place. This criterion largely depends on the notion of the
alienation of property, which is one of the normative barriers embedded in the theoretical justification
of the exhaustion doctrine.93
Property alienating distribution cannot be safely assumed for electronic content owing to the fact that
there is nothing to ensure that the transferor’s entitlement over the file is exhausted, for instance, by
deleting it upon transfer. Amazon’s patent challenges this normative impediment by recreating the
conditions that could lead to property alienation in the online context.
Property alienation and "viral" copies
In cases where users have the possibility of exercising control over the copy, which could for instance
take place through deletion, they should lose this power of control upon transfer of the copy to
another party. This is an inherent component of tangibility: transfer of ownership results in property
alienation. Whereas hard copies of works may pass on from one owner to another—with the
proprietary rights of the first owner on the copy being alienated upon transfer of ownership—the
dissemination of electronic content *I.P.Q. 320 is not followed by the assumption that the user
deletes his copy upon transfer. Technological protection mechanisms most commonly restrict the
reproduction of the digital copy or access to it, but they do not control distribution. Even though it is an
express statutory mandate that exhaustion does not apply to digital copies disseminated online, such
copies are easily transferable objects and ownership may be duplicated or even multiplied upon
transfer, as there is nothing to ensure that the first owner loses possession of the file.
Loss of possession upon transfer
The requirement of property alienating transfers of ownership for the distribution right to take effect
made its way into European copyright in Peek & Cloppenburg.94 Exposition of copyright works in a
warehouse and their use on the spot by customers was not found to qualify as an act of distribution
as it did not entail transfer of ownership.95 With this definition of distribution from the Court of Justice,
authors and the relevant right holders distribute works, and hence lose control over them, only if they
have passed along the ownership of the copies to another party by alienating any entitlement they
may have on the distributed tangible copy. This ruling clarified the scope of the broad definition of the
distribution right, which according to art.4(1) of the Information Society Directive covers "any form of
distribution to the public by sale or otherwise", such as for instance barter, donation endowment or
exchange, i.e. activities that involve sales or other alienation transferring ownership.
The application of exhaustion online would arguably impact on the scope of exploitative rights of the
right holders in a way that exceeds the risks associated to the transfer of hard copies. It is for this
reason that some scholars argue against the application of exhaustion online owing to the lack of a
physical supporting medium.96 Although this position is not supported by everyone,97 alienation
resulting from the transfer of ownership of tangible goods comes with an intrinsic, yet not explicit,
attribute that immaterial copies do not possess: any transfer of ownership "exhausts" the entitlement
of the previous owner of the copy—going back to the original right holder—as transfer alienates any
earlier title of possession. By excluding exhaustion from the public communication right, the
Information Society Directive adopts a narrow position, according to which the right holders remain in
control of every act of electronic dissemination of their works. In the explanatory note to the
Regulations on personal copies for private use in the United Kingdom, the following interpretational
guidance is offered:
"Any personal copies must be destroyed if the individual transfers the work from which they were
made to another person, unless the copyright owner authorises the transfer of the personal copies to
that person. Any personal copy which is not so destroyed or is transferred to another person without
the authorisation of the copyright owner shall be treated as an infringing copy for the purposes of the
Act. *I.P.Q. 321 " 98
This exhaustion rule that features in the explanatory note to the private copying exception means to
preserve the alienation effect that subsequent transfers of ownership ought to have. It can also be
read in a broad sense as covering transfers of ownership of digital files, on condition that the
transferor deletes his copy upon transfer.
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Exhaustion applies if it conforms to this inherent attribute of tangibility that transfers of ownership
alienate the entitlement of the transferor on the copy. This element impacts on, and shapes, the rule
of exhaustion in what I call a "viral" effect: it is not only the authorial distribution right that is exhausted
post-first sale but any rights of possession over the copy should also be "exhausted" with the possible
redistribution of the copy through sale or otherwise, e.g. by donation or other exchange. The viral
effect as a justification for analogue exhaustion heavily relies on the concept of tangibility. Unless the
copy comes in a tangible form, a subsequent ownership or possession does not by default erase the
entitlements of the previous owner or possessor.
Exhaustion applies to the exact same copies that were placed on the market with
authorial consent
This element could be rectified with regards to digital copies, if the conditions of property alienating
transfers of ownership were artificially recreated. The report on the US Digital Millennium Copyright
Act makes a reference to "forward and delete" mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that are functionally
equivalent to the transfer of tangible copies because they enable the deletion of the source copy upon
its successful transfer. According to the report, these technologies may become a source of legal
uncertainty as they do not correspond to the typical use of digital copies99 and it is also difficult to
monitor if users have erased their copy post-transfer.100 Amazon’s patent attempts to overcome this
technical difficulty by artificially generating the property alienation effect of transfers of hard copies.101
Because communication entails reproduction to an extent that scarcity of the work is endangered, it
cannot be assumed that there is implicit authorial consent for this communicative act. This is
supported by the construal of the concept of consent in the context of trade mark exhaustion. There,
consent for distribution covers only the exact same copies that have been placed on the market. In
Sebago v G-B Unic, the Court of Justice found that "consent must relate to each individual item of the
product in respect of which exhaustion is pleaded".102 Although this case was determining the
meaning of consent under art.7(1) of the Trade Marks Directive,103 it has developed a doctrinal
understanding of consent in the context of exhaustion of intellectual property rights. Exhaustion
cannot apply where individual items of the product have been placed on the market within the EEA
without the right holders’ consent.104 As the court explained, the purpose is to ensure the further
marketing of individual items that have placed on the market consensually and to prevent right
holders from opposing to such marketing.105 The same interpretation of the impact of consent on the
scope of the rule of exhaustion ought to apply also in the area of copyright law, in the sense that
copies subject to exhaustion are only those that have been placed on the market by *I.P.Q. 322 the
right holders or upon their consent.106 Beyond a purely grammatical reading of art.4(2) of the
Information Society Directive,107 a purposive interpretation leads to the same conclusion, i.e. that
exhaustion applies to those exact copies that were put on the market with the right holders’ consent.
In the United States, there have been a number of cases examining the "repackaging" of copyright
works after these have been put on the market with the right holders’ consent, including but not
limited to the rebinding of copies of literary works for purposes of restoration,108 the recompilation of
journals,109 or the use of hard copies of works with a view to produce derivatives.110 It is an
established principle under US copyright too, however, that the first sale doctrine applies to the exact
same copies that have been placed on the market or upon the right holders’ consent. In American
International Pictures Inc v Evan Foreman,111 it was clearly stated that:
"for purposes of the first sale doctrine, each copy is unique; if the copyright holder possesses 100
copies and sells 99 of them, the final copy nonetheless remains protected from infringement".112
Reproduction v communication
A very restrictive explication of this inherent condition of exhaustion was expressed in ReDigi.113 In
this case, the District Court of New York explicitly stated that the first sale doctrine covers only
distribution but cannot involve reproduction. ReDigi’s first sale question turned on whether a digital
music file could be lawfully resold, same as a used record would. The leading argument of ReDigi in
support of its first sale claims was that the only remaining copy at the end of the transaction was the
one with the buyer. The court found that because the transfer of the electronic file—as opposed to the
physical embodiment of the *I.P.Q. 323 work—could not be realised without making a copy, it was
infringing the copyright owner’s reproduction right, which is not covered by the first sale doctrine. Fair
use could also not be substantiated in this regard. This was the case irrespective of the fact that it
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was technically feasible to have only one file available before and after the transfer.114 To the court, "it
is the creation of a new material object and not an additional material object that defines the
reproduction right",115 and, given this finding, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s reproduction right
was infringed.
This sharp insight into the nature of digital reproductions was sufficient to outweigh ReDigi’s defence
that was based on earlier decisions, such as Paula v Logan,116 where an obiter justification for
exhaustion was developed. The defendant in this case used a "transfer medium" to remove
in-copyright designs from greeting cards and notepads and affixed the removed images to ceramic
plaques. This was found not to be infringement on the grounds that the redistribution of the artistic
works featuring in greeting cards and notepads did not involve copying.117 This reasoning could not
apply in ReDigi, however, where new copies were made though the resale software, irrespective of
the fact that scarcity was maintained by deleting copies upon transfer of ownership.
Introducing exhaustion by the back door?
It is not clear whether the European courts would adopt the same position. The public communication
right is not independent from copying as it technically involves an act of reproduction. In the very few
cases where it does not, as with the provision of mere hyperlinks, the Court of Justice found that
internal limits to the communication right "exhaust" authorial entitlement—although not expressly
affirming copyright exhaustion, which would in any case be obiter. In Svensson, for instance, the court
found that where the communication takes place through the same technical means as those used by
the right holder, it amounts to infringement only when it is directed at a "new public", that is to say, at
a public that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial
communication to the public.118 It follows that when the communication is addressed with the same
technical means to the "same old" public that the right holders had in mind when authorising the initial
communication, there is no infringement. This is an important clarification as to the internal limits of
the public communication right. Although this right is meant to be understood in a broad sense,119
once the right holders have authorised the initial communication, their entitlement to control the
retransmission of the same content through the same technical means and to the same audience
ceases to exist. This takes us back to the very core of the exhaustion doctrine, which is here
reintroduced by the back door. It has to be acknowledged that this precedent is bound by the
limitations of the subject-matter in question. The application of this form of exhaustion remains
therefore limited.
In other cases on the public communication right, the Court of Justice did not reach the same
conclusion. In particular, in TV Catchup, the Court of Justice found that the live internet streaming of
TV broadcasts ought to be covered by a separate licence and was hence not exempt from
infringement. It held that the *I.P.Q. 324 requirement that there ought to be a new public needed not
be examined, as the main proceedings concerned the transmission of works included in a terrestrial
broadcast and the making available of those works on the internet. In this light, the mode of
communication of the works differed from the one originally licensed by the right holders concerned
and it had to be subject to a separate licence.120 Had this not been the case, and if the content was
not addressed to a new public, it is likely that the use would not amount to infringement.121 Even
though considerations of a new public are not an express affirmation of copyright exhaustion, they
could be seen as the doctrinal equivalent of copyright exhaustion through the construal of internal
limits to the communication right, which is otherwise to be understood in a broad sense.
A central difference between Svensson and TV Catchup, however, rests within the very nature of the
retransmission of the work. Mere hyperlinks, as in Svensson, fall under the public communication right
but do not involve copying. This is not the case with live streaming services or with hyperlinks that
embed content, which entail an act of reproduction.122 The broad construal of the public
communication right, coupled by the fact that the default rule is that online exhaustion is statutorily
excluded by virtue of art.3(3) of the Information Society Directive, has become an issue of concern. In
its recently issued Public Consultation on the Review of the EU copyright rules, the Commission
expressly addresses this issue.123 Because two rights are involved in a single act of exploitation,
online licensing of works can be complicated, especially in cases where different parties hold the two
rights. Clarity could be achieved if the communication right was viewed holistically and acts of
reproduction that are an integral and essential part of this technical process were exempt from
infringement.124 This would have to take place in instances where are no additional copies made, no
"new public" is reached, and scarcity is ensured.
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Conclusion
Reliance on tangibility and its various facets cannot viably negate exhaustion in the online context as
this would set aside the rich and longstanding benefits resulting from the rule of exhaustion, which
means ensuring access and autonomy, and also enhancing competition and transactional freedom.
Online exhaustion is neither legally foreclosed nor technically impossible. The WIPO Treaties, which
first introduced the public communication right, do not exclude the possibility of online exhaustion. It is
only implied that exhaustion covers the distribution right only. The position adopted by the Information
Society Directive goes beyond these substantive minima and excludes the application of exhaustion
from the electronic dissemination of works. There have been, however, limited instances where
exhaustion or doctrinal equivalents made their way into case law, as was the case in UsedSoft and
Svensson. UsedSoft affirmed that the electronic dissemination of software is covered by the
exhaustion principle and Svensson developed a doctrinal equivalent to exhaustion, according to
which public communications that do not reach a "new public", as is the case with hyperlinks, do not
amount to infringement. From a technical perspective too, new software, such as those owned by
ReDigi and Amazon, envisage the recreation in the online environment of those conditions of
tangibility upon which copyright exhaustion is premised. *I.P.Q. 325
Even though statutes and case law place a lot of emphasis on the presence of a physical copy for
exhaustion to apply, this emphasis is mainly instrumental. Tangibility means to serve as a
distinguishing attribute of goods as opposed to services and thereafter as a criterion of determining
the nature of the legal transaction, i.e. whether it is a sale or a licence. It is not, however, the only
condition in drawing the line. Movability and transferability are two additional parameters to be taken
into consideration in determining whether a copy of a copyright work qualifies as a good, irrespective
of whether it is embodied in a physical carrier or not. What is more, various kinds of entitlements to a
digital copy may arise in online transactions, and the electronic dissemination of copyright content
should not be assumed to qualify as a service. UsedSoft instructs that a transaction is more likely to
qualify as a sales contract and hence generate an ownership title over the content where the copy is
bought with a one-off payment for an indefinite amount of time. This is more likely to afford
consumers with the power to exercise autonomous control over the content. In sales performed under
such conditions, the exhaustion principle can apply.
Because, however, ownership often requires property alienation, the technical recreation of this
attribute of tangibility can lead to this effect by ensuring scarcity upon transfer. Much of the debate
over whether exhaustion can apply online rests on this property alienation effect that is inherent in the
dissemination of tangible goods, and the fact that the scope of the public communication right is
overly broad. Through the newly developed doctrine of the "new public", the Court of Justice seems to
have found a way of imposing an equivalent limit to exhaustion on the communication right, although
not by applying exhaustion. In practice, this means that where content is retransmitted through
technical means same with those originally authorised by the right holders there is no infringement,
insofar as the communication did not reach a new public, that is, a public which was not envisaged by
the right holders when authorising the initial communication. The ambit of this newly developed legal
doctrine, however, is limited and it is not certain whether it could also cover acts of communication
that technically involve an act of reproduction. That would be for instance the case of embedding
copyright content freely available online or reposting news items on blogs. Because of the
controversy generated by the involvement of two rights in a single act of exploitation, a holistic
interpretation of the public communication right is recommended: acts of reproduction that are a
technical and integral part of the communication right should be exempt from infringement, insofar as
there are technical safeguards ensuring that the retransmission of electronic content does not involve
the creation of additional copies.
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